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Abstract—We specify and estimate a dynamic game to study the equilib-
rium relationship between market structure and innovation in the automobile
industry. The quality of each firm’s product for the average consumer, the
key state variable, is modeled as stochastically increasing in innovation,
the dynamic control, which is proxied by patent applications. Equilibrium
innovation is a function of market structure, the vector of quality levels of
all active firms, and the cost of R&D. Our main findings are as follows:
(a) optimal innovation has an inverted-U shape in own quality; (b) holding
own quality constant, innovation is declining in average rival quality but
increasing in quality dispersion; and (c) following entry, each incumbent’s
innovation declines, but aggregate innovation increases in most market
structures. These findings are broadly consistent with the Schumpeterian
hypothesis that market power leads to more innovation.
I. Introduction
SCHUMPETER (1942) advanced the controversial argu-ment that monopoly is more conducive to innovation
than highly competitive markets. This motivated an exten-
sive empirical literature.1 Most studies employ reduced-form
econometric techniques and regress some measure of inno-
vation on a measure of market structure, but the literature has
not produced conclusive findings. One explanation is that the
theoretical relationship is monotonic only under restrictive
circumstances (Boone, 2000; Gilbert, 2006). In particular,
Vives (2008) showed that otherwise robust patterns are still
sensitive to an assumption of endogenous versus exogenous
market structure. Even when within-industry variation is
exploited, as in Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1999),
unobserved firm heterogeneity complicates identification.
The most rigorous applications use instrumental variables
to deal with the possible endogeneity of market structure.2 In
contrast, we study this classic question using a fully specified
structural model. It has the advantage of explicitly incorpo-
rating the evolution of market structure. Within the confines
of the model, we can study the impact of an exogenous
change in market structure on optimal innovation, while still
allowing reverse effects of current innovation on the future
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market structure. A second advantage is the possibility of
running counterfactual experiments. We look in particular
at the impact of entry on innovation. A related advantage
is the possibility to consider market structures that are not
observed in the limited time frame of the data. The equilib-
rium of our model includes an optimal innovation strategy
for each firm in every possible market structure. We can then
compare firms’ behavior when they face different states of
the industry, that is, different competitive situations, holding
everything else constant.
The structural approach, though attractive, has its own
problems. Most important, one needs to make several func-
tional form and other simplifying assumptions to make the
estimation of the model and computation of equilibrium fea-
sible. To limit these concerns, we have adopted demand and
marginal cost specifications and behavioral assumptions that
are commonly used in empirical work. We also perform a
few robustness tests to verify the sensitivity of our estimates.
Our results indicate that in spite of the necessary simplifi-
cations, the model still leads to an innovation policy that is
quite sensitive to the market structure.
Our approach can be thought of as a theory-guided exer-
cise to measure market structure and innovation and study
the equilibrium relationship between them. The estimated
structural model rationalizes the observed behavior in the
data. We then use it to understand the intricate ways in which
innovation incentives are shaped by different aspects of com-
petition and to study innovation incentives in situations that
are not observed.
In our model, each firm produces a differentiated product
that is characterized by the firm’s product quality. As con-
sumers trade off price and quality, a firm has two levers to
influence its market share and profits: price and investment
in R&D. The price affects only the current profits and has
no impact on future decisions. It is chosen strategically in
each period, taking qualities of rival products as given. The
investments in R&D, however, can have long-lasting effects
as they stochastically increase the quality of a firm’s prod-
uct. This is a strategic and forward-looking decision that
requires a dynamic model as costs and benefits accrue in
different periods. The optimal R&D policy of a firm takes
the actions of its rivals into account, as well as its impact on
the likelihood of possible future market structures.
We estimate our model on the global automobile indus-
try, which provides an interesting environment to study the
relationship between market structure and innovation. It
is one of the most innovative industries in terms of both
R&D expenditure and patents granted. Many firms in the
industry have experienced a pronounced change in their
competitive position over the sample period, 1982 to 2006,
which provides identifying power to estimate the structural
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parameters. The more globalized operations of some initially
regional firms have made the global market structure more
symmetric, with a diminished role for fringe firms and for
the very largest firms.
Only a few other papers have studied the interrelation
between innovation and market structure in a dynamic model
of strategic interaction. Goettler and Gordon (2011) study
the microprocessor industry and explicitly incorporate the
durable nature of the good by making demand and price-
setting dynamic as well. They estimate the primitives from
the actual AMD-Intel duopoly and perform a counterfactual
analysis of innovation under monopoly. They find that Intel
would innovate more as a monopoly, but this depends cru-
cially on the durable nature of the good. Product upgrades
are necessary to stimulate demand, and they happen only
if consumers value quality highly and are relatively price
insensitive.
Xu (2008) analyzes innovation decisions in the Korean
electric motor industry. In addition to the cost of R&D, he
also estimates R&D spillovers, adjustment costs of phys-
ical investment, and the distribution of plant scrap value.
As he uses the oblivious equilibrium concept of Weintraub,
Benkard, and Roy (2008), there is no strategic interaction
between plants in the innovation decision. Plants only opti-
mize relative to a stable industry state. Finally, Siebert and
Zulehner (2010) study the reverse question of ours: how
does innovation affect market structure? In their study of
the dynamic random-access memory industry, they estimate
the evolution of sunk entry costs as the innovation intensity
and market demand increase over time. Through their effects
on entry and exit, these costs determine equilibrium market
structure.
Our approach differs from these other studies in a num-
ber of ways. First, we model a continuous control variable,
innovation rather than a 0-1 decision in the more common
discrete dynamic games. We rely on the two-step estimation
strategy of Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), which does
not require solving for the equilibrium. This estimator has
been used in only a few other empirical applications.3
Second, we estimate a model of dynamic industry equilib-
rium for the automobile industry, a popular proving ground
for static models of firm competition in industrial organiza-
tion. Hence, we can rely on functional form and behavioral
assumptions that are widely used and well understood. Our
approach differs from Goettler and Gordon (2014), who
study how innovation incentives and optimal policies change
as they vary the parameter values for key primitives. We use
only the policy vector calculated from the estimated parame-
ter values and the most plausible behavioral assumptions for
the industry we study. Even in this limited setting, we find
innovation incentives to vary greatly with the competitive
situation a firm faces.
3 Two examples are Ryan (2012), who studies the effect of environmental
regulation on the cement industry, and Ching (2010), who modified the
estimator to simultaneously estimate the demand and policy functions and
study demand dynamics for prescription drugs after patent expiry.
Third, we study the impact of market structure on innova-
tion by comparing the equilibrium innovation policies at dif-
ferent values for the industry state. Within the confines of the
model, this can be interpreted as a causal effect. Exogenous
shocks, such as entry, mergers, or even a lucky series of qual-
ity improvements, can easily lead to industry states that differ
from any we observe in the data, but this does not pose any
problem. Our approach differs from Benkard, Bodoh-Creed,
and Lazarev (2010), who use only the policies that are esti-
mated directly from the observable data. While they do not
need to solve for the equilibrium, they need to assume that
firms have no overall design for their network such that data
from different markets provide independent information.4
A key finding is that market structure has a nuanced effect
on innovation incentives which makes it difficult to summa-
rize overall patterns. A few facts stand out. First, optimal
innovation has an inverted-U shape in own quality. Because
in our model the price-cost markup tends to be increasing in
own quality, this pattern mimics the relationship first illus-
trated in Aghion et al. (2005), though in our case, it is at
the firm level and not at the industry level. While oppos-
ing efficiency and replacement effects are also at play in
our model, technological features of the estimated cost and
quality improvement functions are very important as well.
Second, holding own quality and all primitives constant
(e.g., substitutability of products, cost and effectiveness of
R&D, impact of quality on marginal cost), optimal inno-
vation is quite sensitive to the competitive situation a firm
faces. Specifically, it is decreasing in average rival quality
and increasing in quality dispersion. Third, following entry,
innovation by incumbents unambiguously declines. These
last findings are consistent with the Schumpeterian hypoth-
esis, but not with several recent studies that find stronger
international competition to boost innovation.5 However, we
do find that aggregate innovation increases following entry
in most states of the industry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we provide background information on the global automo-
tive industry and the data we use. In section III, we introduce
the static and dynamic elements of the model as well as the
Markov Perfect Equilibrium concept. We present the two-
step estimation methodology and the parameter estimates
in section IV. In section V, we use the estimated model to
analyze the equilibrium interaction between innovation and
market structure. We conclude in section VI.
II. Background on the Industry and Data
A. Innovation
The automotive industry is well suited to investigate the
interaction between innovation and market structure in a
4 Saying anything about states that are not observed in their approach
requires purely statistical extrapolation.
5 See Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenan (2011) or Aw, Roberts, and Xu
(2011), among others.
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Table 1.—R&D Expenditure by Industry in Selected Countries, 2006 (in PPP $billion)
Industry (ISIC Rev. 3) United States Japan Germany Korea France
Chemicals (24) 46.3 16.4 8.2 2.1 5.0
Radio, TV, Telecommunications Equipment (32) 31.2 12.2 4.1 13.3 2.8
Motor Vehicles (34) 16.6 17.9 14.4 4.2 4.6
Medical, Precision, Optical Instruments (33) 22.4 4.6 3.5 0.4 1.6
Computing and Related Machinery (30) 7.4 14.1 0.6 0.4 0.2
Includes all sectors in the top three by R&D expenditure in any of the five countries. Industries are sorted by total R&D expenditure across the five countries.
Source: OECD ANBERD database, edition 2009 (online).
strategic context. Demand estimates (see, e.g., Berry, Levin-
sohn, & Pakes, 1995, and Goldberg, 1995) indicate large
markups over marginal costs, consistent with the view that
fixed costs are important in this industry. Innovation is an
important source of product differentiation as firms improve
their competitive position through higher product quality,
greater reliability, and the introduction of new product fea-
tures. In addition, the industry is the poster child for the
importance of productivity-enhancing process innovations
(Van Biesebroeck, 2003).
Producing automobiles is a highly research-intensive
activity. In 2003, more than 13% of all R&D in OECD coun-
tries was by firms in ISIC industry 34, Motor Vehicles, more
than in any other industry. In 2006, the industry was in third
place. Statistics in table 1 illustrate the importance of auto-
motive R&D in the five most innovative economies. The
industry is in first or second place in terms of R&D spend-
ing in each country, except for the United States, where
it is fourth. The top thirteen automotive firms spent more
than $55 billion on R&D in 2005, and the share of auto-
motive research that is publicly funded is smaller than the
economy-wide average.
The industry is also a heavyweight on the output side
of the innovation process. In the 25-year sample period,
these same thirteen firms were awarded more than 50,000
patents by the U.S. patent office.6 In the estimation, we use
the annual number of patents a firm applies for as a proxy for
its innovative activities.7 We use patents applied for rather
than patents granted to minimize time delay problems. We
use patents rather than R&D expenditures because the R&D
data have only become available in recent years through con-
solidated global accounts, and those too are not available for
all firms. Moreover, these firms spend large amounts on engi-
neering and product design, which in some countries might
be partially included in R&D expenditures.
The information on patenting comes from the PATSTAT
database. Since firms often file for patents through various
subsidiaries, we searched the database for all records con-
taining the core of the parent firm’s name and manually
6 Five percent of all patents filed in the European patent office (by EU
applicants) are in the narrow IPC category B60 Vehicles in General, which
is only 1 of 127 categories and contains only a subset of motor vehicle–
related innovations. The corresponding fraction at the U.S. patent office is
3%.
7 Patents are a widely used measure of innovation output. In a survey on
the use of patents as a measure of technological progress, Griliches (1990)
concludes, “In spite of all the difficulties, patents statistics remain a unique
resource for the analysis of the process of technical change” (p. 1701).
Table 2.—Market Shares in the Initial and FinalYear of the Sample
1982 2006
Sales Market Sales Market
(000) Share (000) Share
GM 6,463 17.3% 8,680 12.5%
Ford 5,415 14.5% 7,242 10.4%
Toyota 3,282 8.8% 8,808 12.7%
Nissan 2,604 7.0% 3,478 5.0%
VW 2,200 5.9% 5,720 8.2%
Renault 2,026 5.4% 2,433 3.5%
Fiat 1,798 4.8% 2,288 3.3%
PSA 1,644 4.4% 3,366 4.8%
Chrysler 1,408 3.8% [merged with Daimler]
Honda 1,015 2.7% 3,550 5.1%
Daimler 701 1.9% 4,749 6.8%
Suzuki 606 1.6% 2,174 3.1%
BMW 377 1.0% 1,374 2.0%
Hyundai 91 0.2% 3,753 5.4%
Sample total 29,631 79.4% 57,615 83.0%
Global total 37,337 69,438
Source: Ward’s Automotive and Automotive News.
verified the results. The number of applications for each firm-
year observation to the U.S. and European patent offices are
combined as follows: xjt = max(xUSjt , λxEUjt ). λ is the rela-
tive weight given to more expensive and more demanding
European patents. It is computed by taking the ratio of U.S.
to European patent applications of four large firms that have
significant sales and production in both regions: Daimler,
Ford, Honda, and Toyota. We compute this weight to be
2.36. Our interpretation is that for automotive firms, one
European patent represents the same amount of innovation
as 2.36 American patents.
B. Market Structure
The automotive industry is concentrated globally, mak-
ing it likely that firms will take actions of competitors into
account when deciding on their own level of innovation. We
measure sales by the number of vehicles sold worldwide
by each firm and its affiliates. This information is obtained
from Ward’s Info Bank, the Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks,
and the online data center of Automotive News for the most
recent years. Market shares in table 2 are computed as a
fraction of total worldwide new vehicle sales.
We focus on only the largest firms as we are primarily
interested in strategic interactions. Using as the inclusion
criterion “at least 1% of global sales in any year,” we are
left with a sample of fourteen firms. The merger between
Daimler and Chrysler in 1998 is treated as an exogenous
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event that reduced the number of firms to thirteen.8 Together
these firms sold 79% of all new vehicles worldwide in 1982
and 83% in 2006. They almost surely account for an even
larger fraction of innovation.9 The balance of new vehicle
sales is by smaller firms, and we assume that they do not
innovate strategically. In the model, their sales are captured
by an outside good.
A few important changes in market structure between
1982 and 2006 stand out in table 2. As the largest firms—
GM, Ford, and the union of Nissan-Renault—lost market
share and the smallest firms gained the most, the industry
became more symmetric. While many firms still made the
bulk of their sales in their home region in 1982, by 2006 all
firms operated globally. The sample firms also took market
share away from the peripheral firms, partly as a result of
takeovers. The fortunes of the firms that gained market share
also varied tremendously. While PSA increased its share by
one-tenth, from 4.4% to 4.8%, Honda almost doubled it,
from 2.7% to 5.1%, and Hyundai increased it by a factor of
more than 20, from 0.24% to 5.4%.
C. Other Variables
It would be infeasible to model firms as planning the
full evolution of their product portfolio in a strategic and
forward-looking manner. In the dynamic model, we abstract
from the different vehicle models each firm sold. Instead, we
assume a single model that is characterized by a price and
a quality level. The trade-off between these two characteris-
tics is captured by the demand curve. It is estimated jointly
with the marginal cost curve using the full set of models and
taking more detailed vehicle characteristics into account, as
in Berry et al. (1995).
We have updated the data sets for the U.S. new vehicle
market from Petrin (2002) and the new vehicle market in
five European countries from Goldberg and Verboven (2001)
to 2006 using comparable information from JATO Dynam-
ics. The product characteristics we use are size (length ×
width × height), horsepower by weight, and fuel efficiency
(miles per dollar). We use list prices for the base models.
For the dynamic estimation, we construct a firm-level
average price within each region as the sales-weighted aver-
age of the prices of individual models. Prices are deflated
using the CPI for New Vehicles from the U.S. Department of
Labor and using the Harmonized Index of Consumer prices
for Motor Cars in the euro area from Eurostat (1996–2006)
or the respective European countries’ CPI (prior to 1996).
To aggregate across the two regions, we first deflate prices
within each region and then divide the European prices by
1.25. This was the average euro–dollar exchange rate in 2006
8 We also estimated the model treating the partnership between Nissan
and Renault in 1999 as a merger, but this had little impact on the estimates.
9 Based on patent applications from automotive firms headquartered in the
United States, Europe, Japan, or South Korea, the fraction exceeds 95%.
Table 3.—Summary Statistics
10th 90th
Variable Mean SD Percentile Percentile
Patent applications 255 255 11 607
Sales (in thousands) 3,177 2,362 748 7,626
Price (in thousands of 1983 $) 11.3 4.08 7.24 18.2
The number of observations for each variable is 341.
and similar to the 1.21 average rate for 1994, the midpoint
of the sample.10
Summary statistics for the three variables used in the
dynamic model are reported in table 3. The fourth variable,
firm quality, will be constructed from the estimated demand
function. Recall that the sample contains thirteen to fourteen
firms over 25 years (1982–2006). The included firms are
highly innovative, applying for an average of 255 patents
per year, but the variation in innovative activities is quite
large. Average annual sales is 3.2 million vehicles, and the
average vehicle sells for $11,300 in 1983 U.S. dollars.
D. A First Look at the Relationship
To illustrate the difficulty of learning about the nature
of the relationship between competition and innovation, we
plot in figure 1 the empirical relationship in the raw data. In
the top panel we use market-level information, the average
across active firms of the number of patent applications per
million dollars of revenue versus the Herfindahl index (HHI)
of the firms’ market shares.
Overall, it seems that lower concentration or more com-
petition is associated with higher innovation. The pattern is
weak, but the negative coefficient on the linear HHI term in
the fitted (cubic) line is highly significant. This pattern relies
solely on time series variation. As concentration has fallen
over time, patenting has risen. Whether this relationship is
causal is difficult to say. It is well known, for example, that
the overall rate of patenting in the economy has increased
over time, especially since 1984 (Hall, 2004).
Concentration in market share is, of course, only one
possible measure of competition. In Hashmi and Van Biese-
broeck (2012), we used a broader sample of firms, and over
the same time period, industry consolidation reduced the
number of independent firms gradually from 24 to 13. Given
that average innovation (as well as aggregate innovation)
was also increasing over time, that pattern would suggest
a reverse interpretation. Fewer firms (i.e., less competition)
are conducive to innovation.
The aggregate relationship hides important underlying
variation. Even conditioning on the extent of competition in
the industry in a given year, innovation differs widely across
firms. The relationship between firm size, measured by real
revenue, and the number of patent applications is depicted
10 At the start of the sample period, the exchange rate fluctuated a lot, with
the weighted national currency equivalent of the euro–dollar exchange rate
declining from 1.35 in 1980 to 0.74 in 1985 and recovering subsequently
to 1.30 in 1992.
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Figure 1.—Empirical Relationship between Innovation and
Market Structure
in the bottom panel of figure 1 (pooling all years). The fitted
line is estimated using year fixed effects that absorb any-
thing year specific but constant across firms, such as the
increasing rate of patenting. The relationship is inverted-U
shaped.11 The smallest firms tend to patent the least, while
the most innovative firms are those in the middle of the size
distribution.
This pattern is consistent with the evidence for U.K. man-
ufacturing firms in Aghion et al. (2005). Even the earlier
patterns at the industry level—higher innovation with lower
concentration or with fewer competitors—could be consis-
tent with opposing efficiency and replacement effects, but
with different effects dominating depending on the market
structure proxy. To gauge whether the mechanisms that gen-
erate these patterns in the automobile industry are consistent
with the interpretation in Aghion et al. (2005), we need a
model of firm behavior and industry competition.
11 In Hashmi and Van Biesebroeck (2012), we show graphs for individual
years and the same inverted-U relationship appears. The pattern is even
more pronounced using patents by revenue as the innovation measure.
III. The Model
We write a simple model of industry equilibrium with
forward-looking innovation decisions. Firms decide on their
innovation effort based on the current market structure and
a (private) cost of innovation. At the same time, they realize
that their individual decisions collectively and stochastically
determine the evolution of the market structure. Our model-
ing strategy follows Ericson and Pakes (1995) except for the
absence of entry and exit, which have not been important in
this industry over the last decades.
To study strategic innovation decisions, our unit of anal-
ysis is the firm. However, to obtain credible estimates of the
demand and marginal cost parameters, we start at a more
disaggregated level. We first specify the static, within-period
problem as that of a multiproduct oligopolist choosing prices
for all its products while taking all quality levels and the
prices of its rivals as given. This leads to a demand equation
and first-order condition for optimal price setting that can be
estimated jointly. We then show how these two equations can
be aggregated to the firm level. There is no rigorous founda-
tion for the aggregation to a firm-level demand equation, but
it is necessary to make tractable the estimation and analysis
of the dynamic model.12
In the dynamic problem, time is discrete. Firms are het-
erogenous with respect to their relative quality level, the
state variable ξj, which combines both observable and unob-
servable features that make a firm’s product attractive to
consumers. At the beginning of each period, firms observe
the full state vector for the industry, their own cost of innova-
tion, and they decide on price and investment in R&D. While
price setting can be thought of as the equilibrium outcome
of a static Bertrand-Nash game, the investment decisions are
the outcome of a dynamic game of incomplete information.
We now provide some details of both static and dynamic
decisions.
A. The Static Problem
The demand system is derived from a discrete choice
model of individual consumer behavior, following Berry et
al. (1995) and many others studying the automobile indus-
try. There are n active firms, and firm j produces Kj different
vehicle models. There are m consumers in the market, and
each buys one vehicle. The utility that consumer i derives
from buying vehicle kj depends on a vector of vehicle char-
acteristics Xkj , a dimension of quality differentiation ˜ξkj that
is unobservable to the econometrician, the price, and an
additive and idiosyncratic preference shock:13
uikj = X ′kjβ + θppkj + ˜ξkj + εikj . (1)
12 Moreover, different ways to define the firm-level price (we used a
quantity-weighted average) will lead to minor differences in firm-level
relative qualities.
13 We do not use a random coefficients model because our focus is on
the effect of innovation at the firm level, which does not require detailed
substitution patterns.
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Assuming that the idiosyncratic utility shock εikj is i.i.d.
extreme value distributed, we obtain the following expected
market share for model kj:
σkj =
exp(X ′kjβ + θppkj + ˜ξkj)
1 +∑nl=1 ∑kl exp(X ′klβ + θppkl + ˜ξkl ) . (2)
The expected demand for model kj is mσkj .
A number of smaller firms do not innovate strategically.
We combine them into a single benchmark firm and normal-
ize for one of its models the sum of observed and unobserved
vehicle quality to 0: ξk0 ≡ X ′k0β + ˜ξk0 = 0.14 Taking
logs and normalizing, we obtain the following estimating
equation for demand at the model level:
ln σkj − ln σk0 = X ′kjβ + θp( pkj − pk0) + ˜ξkj . (3)
On the supply side, we assume a Nash equilibrium in
strategic price setting for differentiated goods. Firms take
into account the cross-price effects on the demand for all
their products, while taking the industry state as given. Firm
j’s own state is a vector ξ¯j = [ξ1 ξ2 · · · ξKj ], where ξkj =
X ′kjβ+˜ξkj combines all product characteristics that consumers
value. The profit maximization problem of firm j is
πj(ξ¯j, ξ¯−j, p−j, m|θp, θc)
= max
pj
Kj∑
kj=1
{pkj − μkj(ξkj |θc)} mσkj( pkj , p−kj , p−j|θp).
μkj is the marginal cost of producing model kj and is allowed
to vary with quality. Following Berry et al. (1995), we
specify marginal cost as a log linear function,
ln μkj = θc1 + θc2ξkj + ζkj . (4)
This includes an unobservable (to the econometrician) shock
ζj, which is assumed to be i.i.d. across firms and over time
with mean 0. Higher vehicle quality could translate into
higher costs, but cost-reducing process or design innova-
tions could lower production costs while making products
more reliable and attractive.
Given the logit demand specification, the first-order con-
dition for model kj simplifies to
pkj = exp(θc1 + θc2ξkj + ζkj) −
1
θp
(
1 −∑Kjkj=1 σkj
) . (5)
We have to solve
∑
j Kj such first-order conditions simulta-
neously to obtain the equilibrium price vector.15 The price of
each model equals the sum of its marginal cost and a markup
14 This normalization plays a role similar to the outside good in other
applications, only there the full utility from buying the outside good (which
includes the price) is normalized to 0.
15 The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in this context are proved
by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991).
term. The markup is the same for all models produced by
one firm but differs for firms with different aggregate market
share. The demand and pricing equations (3) and (5) will be
estimated simultaneously. As a robustness check, we also
estimate the demand equation alone and assume constant
marginal costs.
B. Aggregation to the Firm Level
The above model is fairly standard in the empirical IO
literature. From utility-maximizing consumer choices and
(static) profit-maximizing price setting, it generates esti-
mates for the two key primitives we need from the static
model: the price sensitivity of consumers and the impact of
quality on marginal production costs. Innovation, however, is
a firm-level decision regarding a global R&D budget. Inno-
vations have the potential to boost the quality of all the firm’s
models.
The random utility function can also be specified directly
at the firm level. The utility that consumer i obtains from
purchasing the representative product of firm j is
uij = θppj + ξj + εij. (6)
Here we lump the observable and unobservable product
characteristics in a single quality index ξj, but the price coef-
ficient has the exact same interpretation as in equation (1).
The same extreme value assumption and normalization as
before now generates an expression for the relative product
quality:
ξj = (ln σj − ln σ0) − θp( pj − p0). (7)
This implicit definition of quality as the residual of
the demand equation—the firm’s (relative) market share
adjusted by its (relative) price—mirrors the approach in
Khandelwal (2010). Market shares are determined by price,
which is chosen in the short run, and quality, which is fixed
in most models. In our case, quality is a state variable under
the firm’s control, but it evolves only slowly as the benefits
of innovation accumulate. Similar to Ackerberg, Crawford,
and Hahn (2011), we only need the parameter governing the
price elasticity and lump other determinants of market share
into the quality term.
The first-order condition for price setting is entirely
unchanged. We already saw that the optimal markup for a
multiproduct firm facing a logit demand depends on only
its aggregate market share. Assuming that the sensitivity of
marginal cost with quality at the model level also holds at
the firm level, we can express the supply-side equation in
relative terms as
pj − p0 = exp(θc2ξj + ζj − ζ0)
− 1
θp
(
1
(1 − σj) −
1
(1 − σ0)
)
. (8)
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If a firm’s quality relative to that of a peripheral firm can-
not grow infinitely large, the dynamic problem is naturally
bounded.16
The aggregate price of firm j is the sales-weighted average
of the prices of its Kj models. Equation (7) then provides
the quality levels for firms in the observed industry states.
Together with a full set of first-order conditions, equation
(8), and an evolution of the peripheral firm’s marginal cost,
it allows us to calculate relative prices and market shares
from each industry state (vector of firm qualities). Once the
parameter values for θp and θc are known, the vector of equi-
librium profit values for all firms can also be calculated for
any state of the industry using17
π∗j (ξj, ξ−j, m|θp, θc)
= { p∗j − μj(ξj|θc)} mσj(ξj, ξ−j, p∗j , p∗−j|θp). (9)
C. The Dynamic Problem
Firms innovate because innovation has the potential to
increase the quality of their products. To analyze this deci-
sion, we first have to be more specific about the domain of ξ.
Ξ is defined by specifying lower and upper bounds and dis-
cretizing the intermediate range of possible values in steps of
Δξ. As a result, Ξ = {ξmin, ξmin + Δξ, . . . , ξmax − Δξ, ξmax}.
Recall that ξj is the relative quality of firm j, normalized by
the quality level of a peripheral firm. This makes it likely
that ξj is naturally bounded.
The cost of R&D comprises a common part and a private
shock νj. The first is allowed to vary with R&D expendi-
ture xj, and the second is assumed i.i.d. across firms and
observed only by firm j. The random shocks have a sim-
ilar interpretation as the choice-specific state variables in
Rust (1987) or Gowrisankaran et al. (2010). They ensure
that each investment choice has positive probability. The
state vector for firm j is {ξ1, · · · , ξj, · · · , ξn, νj}, which we
write as sj = {ξj, ξ−j, νj}.18 In our model, firm heterogeneity
is captured by sj, and beyond it the firms are homogeneous.
Investment in R&D is decided strategically based on
the current cost and the expected value of a future profit
stream. The dynamic problem is recursive, and, assuming
stationarity, it can be described by the following Bellman
equation
Vj(ξj, ξ−j, νj|θ) = max
xj∈R+
{
πj(ξj, ξ−j|θp, θc) − c
(
xj, νj|θx
)
+ βE[Vj(ξ′j, ξ′−j, ν′j|ξj, ξ−j, xj, θ)]
}
, (10)
where β is the discount factor and c(·) the cost of R&D,
a function of the dynamic parameters θx. θ combines all
16 ξ0t is assumed to evolve stochastically and exogenously, and normalized
to 0 in each period.
17 We implicitly assume that the shock to marginal cost is unobserved at
the time when the R&D decision is made. Hence the profits in equation (9)
are expected profits.
18 The market size m is another state variable, but we assume it is constant
over time to focus on innovation incentives in a stochastic steady state.
parameters of the model. The variables with a prime denote
the next period values. The expectation is with respect to the
evolution of the entire state vector s′j, and firm j conditions
this on xj, ξj, and ξ−j, but not on νj which is assumed to be
i.i.d. over time.
The expected value can be written explicitly as
E
[
Vj(ξ′j, ξ
′
−j, ν
′
j|ξj, ξ−j, xj, θ)
]
=
∫ ∑
ξ′−j
∑
ξ′j
Vj(ξ′j, ξ
′
−j, ν
′
j|θ)Pξ(ξ′j|ξj, xj, θt)
× Pξ(ξ′−j|ξ−j, x−j
(
ν−j
)
, θt)dν,
where θt are the parameters in the state transition function.
The evolution of νj is straightforward. We assume it to
be i.i.d. over time and to follow a normal distribution with
0 mean and standard deviation σν, one of the dynamic
parameters in the vector θx. We estimate the integral using
Gaussian-Hermite quadrature.
The evolution of ξj, denoted by Pξ(ξ′|ξ, x, θt), depends on
the firm’s innovation choice and its current product qual-
ity. Following Ericson and Pakes (1995), we assume that
the next period’s quality level can take only three possible
values. On the discretized domain, quality can increase or
decrease by one step or remain unchanged. The probability
distribution over these possible future states is given by the
triplet
{
pU , pD, pS
}
, defined as
pU = Pr (ξ′j = ξj + Δξ | ξj, xj) ,
pD = Pr (ξ′j = ξj − Δξ | ξj, xj) , (11)
pS = 1 − pU − pD = Pr (ξ′j = ξj | ξj, xj) .
The evolution of ξ−j is governed by the same probabil-
ity distribution. The only difference is that firm j does not
observe its rivals’ cost of R&D and needs to integrate over
different possible levels of innovation x−j, which themselves
depend on ν−j.
The solution to equation (10) is a strategy profile xj =
χj(ξj, ξ−j, νj|χ−j). The Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE)
of the game is a strategy profile χ∗j that solves equation
(10) given that all rivals follow the same equilibrium strat-
egy as firm j. It is given by χ∗j (ξj, ξ−j, νj|χ∗−j). To estimate
the dynamic parameters θx we exploit the properties of this
equilibrium strategy profile, as described in the next section.
IV. Estimation Methodology and Results
We need to estimate four sets of parameters: demand (θp),
marginal cost (θc), state transitions (θt), and the cost of R&D
(θx). The dynamic parameters θx pose the greatest challenge.
With fourteen firms in the industry, the brute force method
of computing the MPE and matching predicted to observed
innovation decisions is computationally infeasible.
Recently a number of alternative approaches have been
developed that do not require calculating the equilibrium of
the game. They exploit that observed investment decisions
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are equilibrium outcomes and can be used directly to (non-
parametrically) characterize the policy and state transition
functions.19
We adopt the two-step estimator of Bajari et al. (2007)
as it applies directly to our model with a continuous choice
variable.20 In a first step, we combine the estimated state
transition probabilities and equilibrium policy function with
the fully specified period profit function to obtain numerical
estimates of the value function by forward simulation. In a
second step, the dynamic parameters are chosen to minimize
deviations from equilibrium conditions, which occur when a
firm’s value function is lower under the optimal policy than
under a deviation.
We present the parameter estimates immediately follow-
ing the discussion of the estimation methodology for the
different elements of the model. To evaluate robustness, we
always show two sets of results: for the benchmark model
with marginal production costs that vary with quality and for
the constant marginal cost case.
A. Step 1
Demand and cost parameters. As mentioned before, we
estimate the demand and marginal cost parameters using
model-level observations. Equations (3) and (5) contain two
0 mean error terms, ˜ξkj and ζkj , and are estimated simul-
taneously by the generalized method of moments (GMM).
The usual market power shifters—vehicle characteristics of
rivals—are used as instruments to control for endogeneity of
price in the demand equation. These variables are also valid
instruments for market share in the pricing equation.21
Results in table 4 are all reasonable, except for the nega-
tive sign on the fuel efficiency variable in specification (2).
This could be due to the limited set of control variables we
include; we can include only variables that are observed in all
three data sets. Higher fuel efficiency tends to vary inversely
with several other desirable characteristics of a vehicle, such
as size, performance, and luxury or safety features.22
Demand is estimated less price sensitive when marginal
cost varies with quality. The point estimate of −0.222
implies an own price elasticity of −1 for the first per-
centile (cheapest) model, which is just consistent with
profit-maximizing price setting. At the firm level, the median
elasticity is −2.06, and 95% of all elasticities lie between
19 While this approach is widely used in single-agent dynamic problems
since Hotz and Miller (1993), in a dynamic game context the assumption is
less innocuous due to the possibility of multiple equilibria (see Doraszelski
& Pakes, 2007).
20 Alternative approaches include Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and
Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007).
21 We also estimated the system using a demand shifter as an additional
instrument in the pricing equation: the log of aggregate vehicle sales in a
firm’s home market. Results were similar but more sensitive to the exact
sample period used.
22 The mean effect of fuel efficiency was also estimated negatively in Berry
et al. (1995).
Table 4.—GMM Estimates for Demand and Marginal Cost Parameters
Constant MC Log-Linear MC
(1) (2)
Demand parameters
Price −0.302∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.019)
Size 0.382∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.019)
Power/weight 0.444∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.041)
Fuel efficiency 0.082∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗
(miles per $) (0.012) (0.014)
Marginal cost parameters
Constant term 10.262∗∗∗ 2.470∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.091)
Quality (ξ) 0.285∗∗∗
(0.037)
Observations 6,220 6,220
***: Significant at 1%.
−4.96 and −1.26. For the constant marginal cost specifi-
cation (1), all elasticities are one-third higher in absolute
value.
The second important parameter in table 4 is the positive
estimate on quality in the marginal cost specification. A qual-
ity increase sufficient to boost a firm’s market share by 1%
will also raise its marginal production costs by 0.29%. Recall
that the firm’s quality includes both observable product char-
acteristics (X ′β) and a factor that only market participants
observe (˜ξ). This effect reduces innovation incentives, all
else equal.23
Empirical Policy Function. To calculate future profits,
we also need the values of future state variables. Using the
observed patent applications as the dependent variable, we
characterize the empirical innovation policy as a flexible
function of the full vector of state variables. Given the limited
number of observations, we use the following specification:
xjt = α0 + α1ξjt + α2ξ2jt + α3ξ3jt + α4Rank(ξjt)
+ α5Mean(ξ·t) + α6SD(ξ·t) + α7Skew(ξ·t)
+ α8Kurt(ξ·t) + α9IQR(ξ·t) + α10Max(ξ·t)
+ ejt , (12)
which includes a cubic function of the firm’s own quality
and several terms that summarize the quality levels observed
among active firms. These include the first four moments
of the quality distribution—the mean, standard deviation,
skewness, and kurtosis—and aspects of the range of quality
that is observed—the maximum, interquartile range, and the
firm’s own rank in the industry. ejt is an approximation error
between the innovation level that the true policy function
calls for and our prediction.
A few patterns in table 5 are worth mentioning. Higher
own quality leads to more innovation, but the relationship is
inverted-U shaped. The negative terms are large enough to
23 Including a quadratic quality term generates a positive but highly
insignificant point estimate.
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Table 5.—Empirical Policy Functions
Marginal Cost Specification
Dependent Variable: Constant MC Log-Linear MC
Patent Applications (1) (2)
ξjt 0.48 1.93∗∗∗
(0.77) (0.73)
ξ2jt −0.98∗∗∗ −3.28∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.51)
ξ3jt −0.15 −1.53∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.44)
Rank of ξjt 0.04 −0.02
(0.06) (0.05)
Mean(ξ) −1.14 9.48∗∗∗
(1.25) (1.61)
S.D.(ξ) −12.94∗∗∗ −3.68
(3.28) (3.16)
Skewness(ξ) −0.80∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.32)
Kurtosis(ξ) 0.42∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.16)
I.Q.R.(ξ) 5.16∗∗∗ 4.53∗∗∗
(1.52) (1.60)
Maximum(ξ) 1.33 −3.45∗∗
(1.35) (1.45)
Constant 5.12∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗
(0.64) (0.60)
R2 0.26 0.42
Observations 327 327
***: Significant at 1%, **: Significant at 5%.
reduce innovation once own quality is sufficiently high. Inno-
vation is higher when the average quality in the industry is
higher in specification (2), suggestive of a strategic response.
Higher-quality dispersion in the industry also boosts inno-
vation. This is true for the interquartile quality range and
for higher kurtosis (fat tails). A more skewed distribution of
quality boosts innovation, but the quality level of the leading
firm has an opposite effect.
While some patterns are informative and intuitive, all of
these effects interact. This policy function will be used to
estimate the dynamic parameters, and based on those esti-
mates, we can calculate the optimal policy vector that this
function is approximating. The R2 statistic indicates that the
quality levels obtained using the log-linear specification of
marginal cost, the benchmark specification, lead to a much
better fit.
State Transitions. Each firm has two state variables in
our model. The first one is the shock to the cost of innovation.
We assume it to be i.i.d. over time and across firms and
to follow a normal distribution with mean 0. Its standard
deviation is one of the dynamic parameters of the model and
is estimated in step 2.
The second state variable is the quality of a firm’s vehicle
relative to that of the peripheral firm. From one year to the
next, it can go up or down one step or remain unchanged.
Assume that a firm can be hit by a positive or negative shock
that moves its quality up or down by one step. The proba-
bility of a positive shock is p ∈ [0, 1] and increasing in
innovation. The probability of a negative shock is d ∈ [0, 1]
and is due to a quality improvement by the peripheral firm.
Such a negative shock affects the normalized quality level
of all firms at the same time.
p and d are parameterized as follows:
d = θt1,
p = exp(− exp −(θt2 ln(xjt + 1) + θt3ξjt + θt4ξ2jt)).
We do not impose any restrictions on θt1 but expect it to be
positive and less than 1. Using the cumulative density func-
tion (cdf) of a double exponential distribution for p ensures
that it lies between 0 to 1. A positive effect of patenting
on quality will be reflected in a positive value for the θt2
parameter. The quadratic function of ξjt allows the probabil-
ity of a quality improvement for a given level of innovation
to vary across the quality spectrum. For example, it might
become more difficult to improve one’s quality further if it
is high already. It can also incorporate idiosyncratic quality
depreciation or regression to the mean.
Assuming that the two shocks are independent, we can
derive the three transition probabilities in equation (11). The
probabilities of quality moving up, moving down, or staying
put are
pU = p (1 − d),
pD = (1 − p) d,
pS = p d + (1 − p)(1 − d).
Together they fully define the transition function Pξ(ξ′|ξ, x).
However, these general transition probabilities do not
automatically respect the finite state space. We have to
exogenously restrict them at the boundaries: pU(ξmax) = 0
and pD(ξmin) = 0. This could also be achieved by choos-
ing more involved functional forms for p and d, but we do
not view these restrictions as very serious. We have dis-
cretized the quality range with the maximum far beyond
what is reached over the sample period. The bounds do not
limit the absolute quality levels, only the relative quality.
Most important, the estimates imply that although inno-
vation is positive over the full quality range, it becomes
very low even before quality reaches the maximum level.
The restriction is unlikely to affect innovation incentives
greatly, also because firms innovate to avoid depreciation
as well.
To estimate the state transition parameters, we first dis-
cretize the state variable ξ, which is continuous in the data.
To keep the computational burden in step 2 manageable, we
use a relatively coarse grid. ξ can take fifteen different values
from −1.4 to 1.4 in steps of 0.2. This is sufficiently detailed
to generate a correlation of 0.984 between the observed and
discretized values. The maximum value in the data is 0.8,
and there are only two observations (out of 340) for which
the value of ξ equals the lower limit of −1.4.
As in Rust (1987), we estimate the state transition parame-
ters by maximum likelihood. The coefficients in the first row
of table 6 imply that a firm of average quality (ξ = 0) that
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Table 6.—Estimated Transition Probability Parameters
Constant MC Log-Linear MC
(1) (2)
θt1 (same as d) 0.547∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.085)
θt2 (coefficient on x in p) 0.062∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.029) (0.052)
θt3 (coefficient on ξ in p) −0.884∗∗∗ −1.440∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.442)
θt4 (coefficient on ξ2 in p) −0.285 0.403
(0.249) (0.665)
Observations 327 327
***: Significant at 1%, **: Significant at 5%.
does not innovate has a 54.7% or 63.9% chance, depending
on the specification, that its relative quality declines by one
step.
Most important, innovation is found to boost the proba-
bility of reaching a higher-quality level. The effect is twice
as large in the log-linear, benchmark case. It is also intuitive
that the probability of going up one quality level is estimated
lower for firms with higher-quality levels (θt3 < 0). As a
result, a firm that aims for a particular probability of going
up 1 quality step will need to innovate more if its existing
quality is higher. The point estimates imply that a 1 standard
deviation increase in innovation raises pU by 2.1% and low-
ers pD by 3.7%. Holding innovation constant, a 1 standard
deviation increase in ξ lowers pU by 6.1% and raises pD by
10.8%.24
Computation of the value function. Combining all the
building blocks with a set of initial values for the structural
parameter vector θ0x , we can calculate the value function for
any industry state s = {ξ1, · · · , ξn, ν1, · · · , νn}. We do this
by forward-simulating profit realizations.
We start from an initial industry state s0, the vector of
observed quality levels for one year supplemented by a set
of random draws on the cost shocks ν. We solve the system
of first-order conditions, equation (8), with the estimated
demand and cost parameters to obtain the equilibrium price
vector. Market shares are then given by the demand equa-
tion (7) and both variables are substituted in the variable
profit function (9).25 The estimated policy function directly
provides optimal innovation decisions for all firms. Sub-
tracting the cost of innovation from variable profits gives
a vector of values for all active firms in the initial year:
π0(s0) − c(x0, s0|θ0x).
24 The positive effect of patenting on quality can already be seen in the
raw data, and it is quite strong. A 1 percent increase in patent applications is
associated with a 0.25% increase in quality. Dividing quality into a quantity
and price component, as in equation (7), reveals that the effect on price
(0.45%) is stronger than on market share (0.12%).
25 To save on computation, we assume that the shocks to marginal cost have
0 standard deviation. We also experimented with non-0 standard deviation
of the shocks. We found that when the elasticity of demand is low, as it is
in our estimated model, the expected profits with non-0 standard deviation
are very similar to those with 0 standard deviation.
Next, we use the estimated transition probabilities to
update the industry state. For each (xj, ξj), we compute the
three probabilities in equation (11) and then draw a realiza-
tion of ξ′j from the appropriate distribution. With a new set
of draws on ν, this gives s1, the industry state in the next
year. Following the same steps as above, we can compute
the expected net profit for each firm in period 1.
This process is repeated T periods. We have set the dis-
count factor to 0.95 and T to 150 periods (β150 = 3.7e − 6).
The value functions are then simply the present discounted
values of these profit streams,
V(s0|θ0x) = E
[ T∑
t=0
βt[πt(st) − c
(
xt , st|θ0x
)]
]
, (13)
where the expectation is over future states. We perform these
forward simulations 2, 000 times using different draws for
the ν shocks and the realizations of the state transitions.
The average over all simulations is the numerical estimate
of V(s0|θ0x). We repeat this for all observed industry states
by taking each as the starting state for a separate set of
simulations.
B. Step 2
The final step is to estimate the dynamic parameters of
the model using the minimum distance estimator proposed
by Bajari et al. (2007). Let χ∗j (ξj, ξ−j, νj|χ∗−j) be the Markov
Perfect Equilibrium policy profile for firm j. If this is an
equilibrium strategy, the value from following it must be at
least as high as from following any alternative strategy χ′j:
Vj(ξj, ξ−j, νj|χ∗j , χ∗−j, θx) ≥ Vj(ξj, ξ−j, νj|χ′j, χ∗−j, θx).
(14)
Note that firm j deviates from the MPE strategy, while its
rivals still follow their Nash strategies. Equation (14) will
hold at the true parameter vector θ∗x .
Using the forward simulation procedure described
above, we can calculate the value function for both
the optimal and alternative policy profiles. The dif-
ference d(ξj, ξ−j, νj|χ′j, θx) = Vj(ξj, ξ−j, νj|χ∗j , χ∗−j) −
Vj(ξj, ξ−j, νj|χ′j, χ∗−j) enters the objective function of the
minimum distance estimator only if it is negative, that is,
when the equilibrium condition (14) is violated. Conditional
on θx, we calculate these differences for all firms j, indus-
try states s, and alternative policies χ′. ˆθx is then chosen to
minimize the sum of the squared negative terms to minimize
violations of the MPE:
ˆθ∗x = arg min
∑
j, s, χ′
[
min {d(ξj, ξ−j, νj|χ′j, θx), 0}
]2
. (15)
The alternative policies used in the estimation are the
following deviations from the equilibrium Nash policy:
χ′j = (1 + ι)χ∗j , where ι takes the following four values:
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Table 7.—Estimated Dynamic Parameters
Constant MC Log-Linear MC
(1) (2)
θx1 (coefficient on x) 5,141∗∗∗ 2,652∗∗∗
(347.2) (96.17)
θx2 (coefficient on x2) −4.430∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗
(0.795) (0.009)
θx3 (coefficient on x3) 0.724e–3∗∗ 0.209e–6∗∗∗
(0.336e–3) (0.046e–6)
θx4 (coefficient on ν˜x) 884.4 309.6
(2422) (302.8)
Minimum distance estimates. Standard errors are bootstrapped. ***: Significant at 1%, **: Significant at
5%. Using a wider range of perturbations, ι = [.6 .7 .8 .9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4], we obtain similar point estimates,
respectively, 2,530, −0.057, 0.195e-6, and 267.7.
[0.90 0.95 1.05 1.10].26 We parameterize the cost of R&D
function as:
c(xj, νj|θx) =
(
θx1 + θx2xj + θx3x2j + θx4ν˜j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost per patent
xj, (16)
where ν˜j is a standard normal variable and θx4ν˜j = σνν˜j = νj.
Standard errors for the estimates in table 7 are boot-
strapped following the procedure in Bajari et al. (2013),
which ignores sampling error in the first stage. The most
important implication of these estimates is that the average,
as well as the marginal, cost of R&D is declining in the
number of patents. The decline is less pronounced in the
benchmark case of log-linear marginal production costs.
These point estimates imply an average cost per patent of
$3.6 million if we assume constant marginal costs and $2.6
million when marginal costs are increasing in quality. This
difference is intuitive. In the log-linear case, the net benefit
of innovation is reduced because a higher quality level—
the ultimate reason that firms innovate—raises the firm’s
marginal production costs. It makes patents less valuable,
all else equal, and the model can rationalize the observed
rate of patenting with a lower cost of innovation.27
For a subset of the firms in our sample, we have obtained
information on total R&D expenditure from consolidated
accounts in the COMPUSTAT database. It implies average
R&D expenditures per patent application of $8.4 million.
This is higher, but of the same order of magnitude as our esti-
mates. It is plausible that firms derive benefits from patenting
beyond those that we have included in our model. This can
include licensing revenue, obtaining benefits in other sec-
tors where these firms are active, or raising a firm’s value
as a takeover target. Including such benefits in the model
26 Using more perturbations is desirable, but it raises the computational
burden proportionately. As a robustness check, we doubled the number of
perturbations and reestimated the dynamic parameters. We report the results
of that exercise in the notes to table 7. Srisuma (2010) shows that with
additive disturbances, even an infinite number of alternative policies does
not guarantee identification, but with the multiplicative perturbations that
we use, that problem is avoided, at least if the support of the disturbances
is sufficiently large.
27 There are offsetting effects, as the price elasticity is estimated higher
and the effectiveness of innovation to raise product quality is estimated
lower in the constant MC case. These changes also decrease the net benefit
of patenting and help match observed rates of patenting.
would lead to higher cost estimates to rationalize observed
patenting rates.
V. Market Structure and Innovation
A. Computation of Equilibrium
We now turn to our main question of interest. How does
innovation in the global automobile industry depend on the
intensity of competition or the market structure generally?
In principle, one could investigate this using the estimated
policy function from the first stage of the estimation proce-
dure, as in Benkard et al. (2010).28 In the global automotive
industry, we do not observe nearly enough information to
characterize the subtle effects without imposing some theory.
In practice, then, we have to calculate the MPE using the
estimated primitives and our fully specified model. This pro-
vides us with optimal innovation strategies in all possible
market structures.
One benefit of this approach is that one can also use it to
investigate the sensitivity of any pattern to different param-
eter values. Goettler and Gordon (2014) explicitly study
the response of innovation to exogenous changes in prod-
uct market competition, investment spillovers, and the entry
cost distribution by solving a similar model for a variety of
parameter values. A second benefit is that we are not limited
to studying only the very narrow range of market structures
observed over the sample period. If we simulate the evolu-
tion of the industry forward, we see that a wide range of
market structures is visited for relatively brief periods.29
To calculate the MPE, we follow the algorithm of Pakes
and McGuire (1994) and provide some of the details in the
appendix. The computational burden has three sources: the
size of the state space, the computation of the continuation
values, and the number of iterations to convergence. Using
fifteen possible values for ξ and assuming it can transition
to three possible values in the next period, it takes approxi-
mately two days to compute the equilibrium for five firms.30
Note that this allows 243 (= 35) possible values for the indus-
try state in the next period. We demonstrate below that this
equilibrium already contains rich dynamics to inform us on
the question of interest.31
To gauge the fit of the model, we repeatedly draw five
firms randomly from the sample and compare the optimal
innovations for that industry state to the observed innovation
28 Studying the U.S. airline industry, they assume that the route network
is only important locally and can be treated as predetermined. In that case,
thousands of markets (city-pairs) all provide independent information on
firm behavior that is used to characterize the policy function.
29 In figure A.2 of Hashmi and Van Biesebroeck (2012), we illustrate that
the average efficiency level for active firms can change dramatically over a
short period of time.
30 We restrict the computation of equilibrium to five firms for tractability
reasons. As the number of firms increases, the size of the state space and,
hence the computational burden, increases exponentially.
31 For a dynamic game of this size, multiple equilibria are the rule rather
than the exception. We compute just one possible equilibrium, but for the
few sets of starting values that we tried, the algorithm always converged to
the same equilibrium.
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Figure 2.—Relationship between Innovation and a Firm’s Own Quality
data and the predictions from the empirical policy function,
equation (12). The pairwise correlations between the optimal
policies and both benchmarks are rather high: with the data,
it is 0.64 and with the empirical prediction, it is 0.55.32
B. Equilibrium Relationship between Market Structure and
Innovation
We now use the equilibrium strategies of the dynamic
game to investigate the relationship between market struc-
ture and innovation in the global automobile industry. We
characterize the industry by a benchmark firm that does
not behave strategically, representing a fringe of competi-
tive firms, and five firms that invest strategically.33 The first
three figures—figures 2, 3 and 4—highlight that even our
simple model predicts a wide range of optimizing behavior
by taking into account that firms are forward looking and
behave strategically. They illustrate the impact of compe-
tition on a firm’s innovation incentives, holding gradually
more aspects of the market structure constant. In the next
section, we simulate the impact of entry on the incumbents’
innovation incentives.
Figure 2 plots a firm’s innovation against its own quality,
the state variable ξj.34 For each value, there is a range of
optimal innovation choices as the exact value depends on
the market structure a firm faces. The square markers depict
choices when the five (strategic) firms are symmetric; recall
that the peripheral firm’s quality is always normalized to 0.
Innovation clearly traces an inverted-U shape. This inverted-
U is at the firm level, as opposed to the one in Aghion et al.
(2005), who found a similar relationship at the industry level.
32 The correlation between the data and the empirical prediction is 0.48,
which is comparable to the R2 of 0.42 in table 5.
33 Firms’ investment decisions also depend on their private cost of R&D
realizations. We use the expected level of innovation given the distribution
of the cost shock ν.
34 The range of own quality is from −1.4 to 1.4 in increments of 0.2. For
display purposes, in figure 2 and all subsequent figures, we transform this
range into the one from −14 to 14 in increments of 2.
In figure 6, we turn to the effect of increased competition on
industry innovation.
Both the positive relationship between innovation and
quality at the left side and the negative relationship at the
right side can be rationalized directly from the primitives of
the model. The benefit of innovation is to raise the probabil-
ity of a quality improvement. The estimated state transition
process implies that a firm needs to raise its level of innova-
tion to attain the same benefit if its current quality level is
higher. This is one force leading to a positive relationship.
Given the stochastic depreciation of quality, innovation is
necessary even to maintain quality. The declining R&D cost
per patent makes it easier to innovate sufficiently to counter
depreciation and is a second factor leading to a positive
relationship.
At the same time, the value of a higher quality to the firm
is not constant either. It raises demand, but also marginal
production cost. As the latter increases convexly in ξ,
variable profits will eventually become concave in quality
and further improvements will be less valuable. This is an
important factor explaining the negative relationship on the
right. A different quality level also influences the innovation
strategies of a firm’s rivals, but it is not obvious to determine
how this effect leads to variation in innovation incentives
over the quality spectrum.
Over most of the quality range, the maximum optimal
innovation is approximately one-quarter above the minimum
level. At intermediate quality levels, innovation is not only
higher, the optimal strategies are also a lot more dispersed in
absolute values. At higher quality levels, the range is more
compressed. The range of optimal innovation in figure 2
is determined entirely by the varying effect of quality on
demand and by strategic interaction as the production and
innovation costs as well as the state transitions are only a
function of own quality.
Conditional on the level of own quality, innovation is
higher when a firm is a market leader (the smaller black cir-
cles) than if it lags the industry (gray circles). Innovation in
the case of symmetric firms tends to be at the bottom end of
the range, except for the lowest quality levels. The range of
innovation is also wider for leaders. The dispersion is high-
est at ξ = 8 for the leader, with the xmax/xmin ratio equal to
1.21. For laggards, the dispersion is decreasing in own qual-
ity, and for firms in the middle of the industry, dispersion is
almost constant over the entire range.
The small dots in figure 2 show average innovation
across all active firms as a function of their average qual-
ity on the horizontal axis. Because innovation is concave
and eventually even decreasing in own quality, as described
above, average innovation is highest in the symmetric case.
Nowhere in the quality spectrum does the additional innova-
tion of a higher-quality firm compensate fully for the reduced
innovation of a quality laggard. Because innovation does not
rise monotonically with own quality, the dots cover a much
wider range than the solid markers. In the extreme, inno-
vation by symmetric firms can be up to eight times higher
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Figure 3.—Relationship between Innovation and Rival Quality
Quality of the firm whose innovation is shown is held constant at 0.
than average innovation in an industry with the same average
quality level but maximum inquality between active firms.35
This highlights the sensitivity of innovation to own quality
and the importance of holding own quality constant, which
we do in all subsequent figures.36
In figure 3, we only show optimal innovation for a firm
with 0 quality, the same as the outside good, but for different
market structures. On the horizontal axis, we plot the average
quality of its rivals, and the shading of the markers indicates
the firm’s rank in the industry. Optimal innovation ranges
from 202 to 252 patents.37
The dominant pattern is for innovation to be higher when
a firm faces weaker rivals, and the differences can be quite
substantial. For example, a leading firm will lower its inno-
vation by twelve to thirteen patents when the average quality
of its rivals is raised from −14 to −10. At least in this par-
ticular dimension (total or average quality of a firm’s rivals),
innovation is declining in competition.38
Along a vertical line, meaning for a given average qual-
ity level of a firm’s rivals, the markers tend to be darker at
the top. It suggests that firms innovate more when their own
quality rank in the industry is higher, keeping own and aver-
age quality levels constant. There is one exception: when the
average quality is low, the second firm innovates more than
the industry leader.
In most cases, there is still a wide range of optimal poli-
cies. For a leading firm, optimal innovation ranges from 215
to 252, depending on the quality of its rivals. This overlaps a
35 As an example, if one firm is at ξ = −14 and a second one at ξ = 14,
average innovation would be below 50. In contrast, two symmetric firms
with ξ = 0 would apply for more than 200 patents each.
36 Cohen (2010) stresses that a failure of empirical scholars to control
for relevant contingencies is one reason that the existing evidence on the
Schumpeterian hypothesis is inconclusive. At the firm level, controlling for
own quality is perhaps the most important contingency.
37 The range is equally wide for quality levels −2 or +2 but gradually
narrows for more extreme quality levels.
38 This effect is opposite of the sign on mean(ξ) in table 5, but a change
along the horizontal axis of figure 3 influences other variables in the
estimated policy function as well.
Figure 4.—Relationship between Innovation and Quality Dispersion
Quality of the firm whose innovation is shown, as well as the average quality of its rivals, is held
constant at 0.
lot with the optimal innovation policy for a firm in the mid-
dle, which ranges between 208 and 232. If we hold rivals’
quality constant, the range narrows, but for ξ−i = 0, optimal
innovation for firm i still varies between 214 and 225.
In figure 4, the variation within this last range is illus-
trated further. We show innovation for the middle firm (firm
3) whose own quality level is 0. The lines show the con-
tour plots for different innovation levels as a function of a
mean-preserving increase in quality dispersion. Along the
horizontal axis, the gap between firm 3 and its neighbors (2
and 4) is increased. Along the vertical axis, the additional
distance to the overall leader and laggard (firms 1 and 5) is
shown. As a result, the innovating firm’s own quality and
rank in the industry, as well as the average rival quality, are
held constant.
Innovation is lowest in the symmetric case (the bottom-
left corner) when all firms have 0 quality. Away from the
origin, innovation becomes higher as dispersion increases.
The contour lines have a slope steeper than −1, indicating
that raising the gap with the firms at the extremes has a
similar but smaller effect. Moreover, as rival firms differ
more in quality, the contour lines in figure 4 become steeper,
suggesting that innovation incentive becomes smaller as the
quality gap becomes too large.
Whether aggregate innovation increases or decreases
depends crucially on where we conduct this exercise of a
mean-preserving increasing in quality dispersion. On the one
hand, innovation is higher when firms are in the middle of the
quality range. On the other hand, innovation is higher when
rivals are farther from one another. In figure 4 the former
effect dominates, and moving rivals to the quality extremes
lowers their innovation more than it boosts the innovation of
the intermediate firm.
These effects also lead to a positive relationship at the
industry level between concentration in quality and inno-
vation. When quality becomes more concentrated in a few
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Figure 5.—Change in Optimal Innovation for Incumbents after Entry
In the different columns, the new entrant has quality level −14 (left), 0 (middle), or +14 (right). The top graphs show the ratio of optimal innovation for some incumbents in the market structure with five versus four
active firms. The bottom graph shows the difference in innovation.
firms, it raises the concentration in innovation at a more than
proportional rate. However, it also reduces total innovation
in the industry.39
C. Counterfactual Analysis: The Effect of Entry
We now analyze a counterfactual simulation where an
additional firm enters the industry. For all possible mar-
ket structures with four active firms, we calculate how this
changes the optimal innovation of incumbents, holding their
quality levels constant. In the three columns of figure 5 we
show different situations, adding the new firm, respectively,
at the minimum quality level, exactly in the middle, or at
the maximum quality level. The top graphs show the rel-
ative innovation of incumbents in the situation with five
versus four active firms and the bottom graphs the absolute
difference in desired patents.
The most important pattern to note is that all ratios are less
than 1 and all differences are negative. Incumbents always
choose to innovate less when faced with an additional com-
petitor. We believe this is to a large extent driven by the
39 This pattern is shown in figure A.4 of Hashmi and Van Biesebroeck
(2012), and it still holds using the current estimates.
demand function and the nature of price setting in our model.
Each active firm will be able to capture some market demand,
even if its product is relatively unattractive to the average
consumer. This takes market share away from its rivals and
will blunt their innovation incentives. This property of the
logit function is well known (see, e.g., Petrin, 2002) and
is shared by most discrete choice models. Ackerberg and
Rysman (2005) suggest a way to counteract it, which is espe-
cially relevant if one is interested in welfare comparisons
with different number of products.
It is intuitive that the decline in innovation is increasing in
the quality of the entrant (i.e., smallest in the graphs on the
left and most pronounced on the right). This is especially true
for the weakest firms, which are depicted in lighter shades.
On average, innovation is 16% lower, but declines ranging
from 11% to 19% are observed. The average decline is 40%
higher following a high-quality entrant than a low-quality
entrant. This difference is much larger for firms that are
themselves of low quality. The absolute decline in patenting
is always largest for firms with quality around 0, because
their rate of innovation is highest. Such a firm will aim for
at least 26 fewer patents, but the reduction can be as large
as 52 fewer patents.
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Figure 6.—Change in Aggregate Innovation with One Extra Firm
Holding own quality constant, the darker markers tend
to be at lower values in most panels, suggesting that lead-
ing firms respond more to entry than lagging firms do. As
a result, entry will slightly reduce the innovation difference
among incumbents. In our model, the efficiency effect dom-
inates the replacement effect, and innovation incentives are
reduced as the number of active firms increases in a mar-
ket of constant size. Firms do take some market share away
from the outside good, but it is not enough to compensate
for the additional competition. This holds more strongly for
industry leaders than for followers.
Of course, the innovation performed by the newly entered
firm contributes positively to aggregate innovation in the
industry. Whether this effect outweighs the reduced inno-
vations by incumbents depends crucially on the quality of
the entrant. If incumbents have extreme qualities, either high
or low, their absolute decline in innovation would be small
anyway. A new firm entering in the middle of the quality
distribution would aim for up to 250 patents and certainly
would raise aggregate innovation. To verify how likely this
is, we have calculated aggregate innovation in all possible
market structures with four active firms and compare this to
the aggregate innovation with one extra firm.
In the left panel of figure 6, we plot the histogram of the
ratio of aggregate innovation in the two cases using uniform
weights for all possible initial market structures and for any
possible quality level for the entrant. In almost three-quarters
of the cases, aggregate innovation goes up. The additional
innovation provided by the entrant outweighs the declining
innovation of the four incumbents. Given the 16% average
decline that we found in figure 5, this finding is plausible.
If innovation declines, it does so by at most 12%. In a few
cases, the increase is extremely high, but this happens only
when initial innovation is very low. In approximately 1%
of the cases, innovation increases by more than half. The
average increase, when positive, is 14%.
However, not all market structures or quality levels for a
new entrant are equally likely. In the right panel of figure
6, we use more realistic weights to construct a similar his-
togram for the change in aggregate innovation. We now use
the optimal innovation policies and the estimated transi-
tion process for quality to simulate forward 200 years for
100,000 randomly drawn market structures. We discard the
first 100 years and use the remaining to calculate frequency
weights for all possible market structures. The quality of a
new entrant is drawn from the frequency distribution of the
third firm in a market structure with four active firms. This
reflects that firm quality is the result of a string of past inno-
vation decisions, and a new firm is unlikely to enter right
away with a quality drawn from the average quality distri-
bution across all active firms. Using these weights, we find
that the probability that aggregate innovation increases is
even higher. In fully 86% of all cases, aggregate innovation
does increase, but the average increase is only 6.3%.
The analysis in Aghion et al. (2005) showed for U.K.
manufacturing that industry innovation has an inverted-U
relationship with the strength of competition within an indus-
try. Increased competition raises innovation in an industry
that is monopolized but reduces innovation when competi-
tion is already high. Our results indicate that both effects are
indeed possible. They also suggest that the former effect is a
lot more likely for an industry characterized by the demand
and cost features that we estimated for the automobile indus-
try. Especially when we take into account the likelihood of
observing the different market structures, it is relatively rare
for more competition—in our case entry of a new firm—to
reduce industry innovation.
VI. Conclusion
We have accomplished two things. First, we estimated all
parameters in a structural game-theoretic model of strategic,
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forward-looking, innovating firms for the automobile sector.
Second, we calculated the optimal Markov Perfect Equi-
librium policy for this game for all possible states of the
industry and used it to investigate how optimal innovation
responds to exogenous changes in market structure.
The structural approach in this paper has a number of
advantages over more reduced-form approaches. It allows
us to focus on the equilibrium relationships without wor-
rying about endogeneity of market structure or reverse
causality of innovation on market structure. In fact, the struc-
tural approach addresses the endogeneity problem directly
by embedding those two-way interactions explicitly in the
model. Nonmonotonic effects can also be straightforwardly
dealt with by holding some aspects of market structure con-
stant while varying others. Finally, it allows us to study
the relationship across a wider range of industry states than
observed in the data.
Our approach is complementary to theoretical work study-
ing the same question. While it is useful to know what types
of effects are possible in a model of profit-maximizing firms,
it is equally important to know which of these effects matter
most in a model where the primitives are estimated from the
data. We used functional forms for demand and marginal
costs and a price-setting assumption that are widely used in
static models of the automobile sector. The implementation
to the global industry and in a dynamic model necessitated
some additional assumptions, but the estimated model, and
the policy vector in particular, is consistent with the observed
data.
In terms of substantive findings, the parameter estimates in
the demand, marginal cost, and state transition equations are
all plausible. Most important, the benchmark model implies
average R&D expenditure of approximately $2.6 million per
patent (higher if marginal costs are assumed to be constant).
The average cost per patent is decreasing in the rate of patent-
ing, which is consistent with the R&D data. It is obvious that
firms will innovate more when they get a low private draw
on the cost of innovation, but the decreasing pattern even
holds for the common part of the cost of R&D function.
Several of the equilibrium patterns we uncover are sup-
portive of the Schumpeterian hypothesis that increased
competition leads to lower innovation. Faced with rivals of
higher quality, firms cut back on their own innovation, even
though those high-quality rivals are not necessarily innovat-
ing very intensively themselves. Firms innovate more when
operating in a market with highly dispersed quality levels,
holding average quality constant. Following entry, incum-
bents invariably reduce their own innovation. Aggregate
innovation still increases in most cases because the added
innovation by the new entrant outweighs the reduction of
all incumbents. Given that the Schumpeterian hypothesis is
quite controversial, it is remarkable that we find these effects
using functional forms that are widely used in empirical
work.
One limitation of our model is the assumption of i.i.d.
shocks to the cost of R&D. Direct inspection of the data
shows some differences in innovation across firms to persist
over time, which could be due to the heterogeneous costs of
R&D. Some firms are consistently better at innovating than
others. Incorporating persistent shocks would increase the
state-space that firms condition innovation decisions on. It
would also make it harder to rationalize those shocks being
entirely private, but we believe that this is an interesting area
for future research.
REFERENCES
Ackerberg, D. A., G. S. Crawford, and J. Hahn, “Orthogonal Instru-
ments: Estimating Price Elasticities in the Presence of Endogenous
Product Characteristics,” University of Warwick working paper
(2011).
Ackerberg, D. A., and M. Rysman, “Unobserved Product Differentia-
tion in Discrete-Choice Models: Estimating Price Elasticities and
Welfare Effects,” RAND Journal of Economics 36 (2005), 771–788.
Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griffith, and P. Howitt, “Competi-
tion and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 120 (2005), 701–728.
Aguirregabiria, V., and P. Mira, “Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete
Games,” Econometrica 75 (2007), 1–53.
Aw, B. Y., M. J. Roberts, and D. Y. Xu, “R&D Investment, Exporting and
Productivity Dynamics,” American Economic Review 101 (2011),
1312–1344.
Bajari, P., C. L. Benkard, and J. Levin, “Estimating Dynamic Models of
Imperfect Competition,” Econometrica 75 (2007), 1331–1370.
Bajari, P., P. Chan, D. Krueger, and D. Miller, “A Dynamic Model of Hous-
ing Demand: Estimation and Policy Implications,” International
Economic Review 54 (2013), 409–442.
Benkard, C. L., A. Bodoh-Creed, and J. Lazarev, “Simulating the Dynamic
Effects of Horizontal Mergers: U.S. Airlines,” Stanford University
working paper (2010).
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes, “Automobile Prices in Market
Equilibrium,” Econometrica 63 (1995), 841–890.
Bloom, N., M. Draca, and J. Van Reenen, “Trade Induced Technical
Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and
Productivity,” NBER working paper 16717 (2011).
Blundell, R., R. Griffith, and J. Van Reenen, “Market Share, Market Value
and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms,” Review
of Economic Studies 66 (1999), 529–554.
Boone, J., “Intensity of Competition and the Incentive to Innovate,” Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization 19 (2000), 705–726.
Caplin, A., and B. Nalebuff, “Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On
the Existence of Equilibrium,” Econometrica 59 (1991), 26–61.
Carlin, W., M. Schaffer, and P. Seabright, “A Minimum of Rivalry: Evi-
dence from Transition Economies on the Importance of Competition
for Innovation and Growth,” Contributions to Economic Analysis
and Policy 3 (2004), 1–43.
Ching, A. T., “Consumer Learning and Heterogeneity: Dynamics of
Demand for Prescription Drugs after Patent Expiration,” Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization 28 (2010), 619–638.
Cohen, W. M., “Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity and
Performance,” in B. H. Hall and N. Rosenberg, eds., Handbook of
the Economics of Innovation, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland,
2010).
Cohen, W. M., and R. C. Levin, “Empirical Studies of Innovation and Mar-
ket Structure,” in R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig, eds., Handbook of
Industrial Organization, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989).
Doraszelski, U., and A. Pakes, “A Framework for Applied Dynamic Anal-
ysis in I.O.,” in M. Armstrong and R. Porter, eds., Handbook of
Industrial Organization, vol. 3 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2007).
Ericson, R., and A. Pakes, “Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Frame-
work for Empirical Work,” Review of Economic Studies 62 (1995),
53–82.
Gilbert, R., “Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the
Competition-Innovation Debate?” in A. B. Jaffe, J. Lerner, and
S. Stern, eds., Innovation Policy and the Economy, vol. 6 (Cam-
bridge: MA: MIT Press, 2006).
208 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Goettler, R. L., and B. R. Gordon, “Does AMD Spur Intel to Innovate
More?” Journal of Political Economy 119 (2011), 1141–1200.
——— “Competition and Product Innovation in Dynamic Oligopoly,”
Quantitative Marketing and Economics 12 (2014), 1–42.
Goldberg, P. K., “Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in International
Markets: The Case of the U.S. Automobile Industry,” Econometrica
63 (1995), 891–951.
Goldberg, P. K., and F. Verboven, “The Evolution of Price Dispersion in
the European Car Market,” Review of Economic Studies 68 (2001),
811–848.
Gowrisankaran, G., C. Lucarelli, P. Schmidt-Dengler, and R. J. Town, “Gov-
ernment Policy and the Dynamics of Market Structure: Evidence
from Critical Access Hospitals,” University of Arizona working
paper (2010).
Griliches, Z., “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey,” Journal
of Economic Literature 28 (1990), 1661–1707.
Hall, B. H., “Exploring the Patent Explosion,” Journal of Technology
Transfer 30:1–2 (2004), 35–48.
Hashmi, A. R., “Competition and Innovation: The Inverted-U Relationship
Revisited,” this review 95 (2013), 1653–1668.
Hashmi, A. R., and J. Van Biesebroeck, “The Relationship between Market
Structure and Innovation in Industry Equilibrium: A Case Study
of the Global Automobile Industry,” CEPR discussion paper 8783
(2012).
Hotz, J. V., and R. A. Miller, “Conditional Choice Probabilities and
Estimation of Dynamic Models,” Review of Economic Studies 60
(1993), 497–529.
Khandelwal, A., “The Long and Short of Quality Ladders,” Review of
Economic Studies 77 (2010), 1450–1476.
Pakes, A., and P. McGuire, “Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilib-
ria: Numerical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product
Model,” RAND Journal of Economics 25 (1994), 555–589.
Pakes, A., M. Ostrovsky, and S. Berry, “Simple Estimators for the Param-
eters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Examples),”
RAND Journal of Economics 38 (2007), 373–399.
Petrin, A., “Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the
Minivan,” Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002), 705–729.
Rust, J., “Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical
Model of Harold Zurcher,” Econometrica 55 (1987), 999–1033.
Ryan, S. P., “The Cost of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated
Industry,” Econometrica 80 (2012), 1019–1061.
Schumpeter, J. A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York:
Harper, 1942).
Siebert, R., and C. Zulehner, “The Impact of Market Demand and Inno-
vation on Market Structure,” Purdue University working paper
(2010).
Srisuma, S., “Estimation of Structural Optimization Models: A Note on
Identification,” LSE STICERD research paper EM/2010/547 (2010).
Van Biesebroeck, J., “Productivity Dynamics with Technology Choice: An
Application to Automobile Assembly,” Review of Economic Studies
70 (2003), 167–198.
Vives, X., “Innovation and Competitive Pressure,” Journal of Industrial
Economics 56 (2008), 419–469.
Weintraub, G. Y., C. L. Benkard, and B. V. Roy, “Markov Perfect Industry
Dynamics with Many Firms,” Econometrica 76 (2008), 1375–1411.
Xu, D. Y., “A Structural Empirical Model of R&D, Firm Heterogene-
ity, and Industry Evolution,” New York University working paper
(2008).
APPENDIX
Implementing the Pakes-McGuire algorithm
The Pakes-McGuire (PM) algorithm starts with arbitrary value and pol-
icy functions V 0 and X0 that are defined over the entire admissible state
space. We update these functions pointwise and iterate until they converge
to their equilibrium values. The updating goes as follows.
For firm j in state (ξj , ξ−j , νj), we find its equilibrium level of innovation
given V 0 and X0−j . Differentiate the right-hand side of the Bellman equation(10) with respect to xj:
∂c(xj , νj)
∂xj
= β ∂EV
0 (ξ′j , ξ′−j , ν′j)
∂xj
.
We assume the cost of R&D function to take the following form:
c(xj , νj) =
(
θx1 + θx2xj + θx3x2j + θx4ν˜j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost per patent
xj .
This gives the following expression for the left-hand side of the first-order
condition (FOC) above:
∂c(xj , νj)
∂xj
= θx1 + 2θx2xj + 3θx3x2j + θx4ν˜j
To find the derivative on the right, first note that
EV 0
(
ξ′j , ξ
′
−j , ν
′
j
) = pU EV 0 (ξj + Δξ, ξ′−j , ν′j)+ pSEV 0 (ξj , ξ′−j , ν′j)
+ pDEV 0 (ξj − Δξ, ξ′−j , ν′j) .
The derivative, after some simplification, is then given by
∂EV 0
(
ξ′j , ξ
′
−j , ν
′
j
)
∂xj
= b2
xj + 1 Ae
−B(xj ,ξj)−e−B(xj ,ξj)
,
where
A = (1 − θt1)
[
EV 0
(
ξj + Δξ, ξ′−j , ν′j
)− EV 0 (ξj , ξ′−j , ν′j)]
+ θt1
[
EV 0
(
ξj , ξ′−j , ν
′
j
)− EV 0 (ξj − Δξ, ξ′−j , ν′j)] ,
and
B
(
xj , ξj
) = θt2 ln (xj + 1)+ θt3ξj + θt4ξ2j .
Substituting the two derivatives into the FOC and simplifying, we get the
following equation that implicitly defines optimal innovation:
θx1 + 2θx2x∗j + 3θx3x∗2j + θx4νj =
βθt2
x∗j + 1
Ae−B(x∗j ,ξj)−e
−B(x∗j ,ξj)
. (A1)
The right-hand side in equation (A1) is the marginal benefit of having
one more patent. It is decreasing in x if θt2 > 0 (i.e., if more patents lead
to a higher probability of a firm’s quality going up). Our estimates of state
transition parameters indicate that this is indeed the case and ˆθt2 > 0. The
left-hand side is the marginal cost of having one more patent. It is a qua-
dratic function of the number of patents x, and its relationship with x depends
on the dynamic parameter estimates. For our benchmark case (log-linear
marginal cost), the left-hand side is increasing in x at the estimated param-
eters and enables us to find a unique solution to the equilibrium number of
patents.
Once we know the optimal x∗j , we can substitute it on the right-hand side
of the Bellman equation to update the value function:
V 1
(
ξj , ξ−j , νj
) = π (ξj , ξ−j)− (θx1 + θx2x∗j + θx3x∗2j + θx4ν˜j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost per patent
x∗j
+ βEV 0 (ξ′j , ξ′−j , ν′j|ξj , ξ−j , x∗j ) .
We continue to update the value and policy functions until the latter
converges.
